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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
 
Zimbabwe adopted a new Constitution
1
 in 2013 which among other matters provides for a multi-
level system of government. The multi-level system of government consists of the national, 
provincial and local tiers of government, as provided for in section 5 of the Constitution.
2
 This 
new Constitution transformed local government from being a mere creature of central (national) 
government into a tier of government. It guarantees the „right‟ of a local authority to govern, on 
its own initiative, the local affairs of the people within the area for which it has been 
established.
3
 The Constitution also provides that a local authority has „all‟ the powers necessary 
to govern, subject to the Constitution and national legislation.
4
  
Under a multilevel system of government, the national government has the responsibility to 
supervise both provincial and local governments to ensure effective governance.
5
 The new 
Constitution is silent about the role of the national government to supervise local government. 
However, the hierarchical nature of the relationship between governments in the Constitution 
seems to suggest that the national government has a responsibility to supervise local government 
to protect and promote the realisation of certain national and local goals such as equity.
6
   
                                                          
1
 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 20 of 2013. 
2
 Constitution of Zimbabwe, s5. 
3
 Constitution of Zimbabwe, s276. 
4
 Constitution of Zimbabwe, s276. 
5
 See De Visser J Developmental Local Government: A case study of South Africa (2005) 82. 
6
 Machingauta N ‘Supervision of Local Government’ in De Visser J, Steytler and Machingauta (eds.) Local 
government reform in Zimbabwe: A policy dialogue (2010) 140.  
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Supervision of local government can be exercised in various forms.
7
 It can be through the 
establishment of local government institutions and regulating their institutional framework or, 
whereby the national governments exercise a regulatory role in streamlining local government 
functions through the laws that establish local government.
8
 It can also be exercised through 
monitoring, supporting and intervening into local affairs. Regulation is the form of supervision 
relevant to this study. 
The Urban Councils Act (UCA)
9
 regulates the activities of urban local authorities in 
Zimbabwe.
10
 The Act provides for the supervisory role of national government through the 
Minister responsible for local government over urban local authorities. Some of the objectives of 
the supervisory role of the national government are to ensure efficient service delivery, curb and 
prevent corruption and ensure that local authorities deliver on their development mandate.
11
 The 
supervisory powers take various forms including the powers to give directives on matters of 
policy, approve budgets, oversee appointment of senior administration staff of local authorities, 
supervision of procurement, appointment of caretakers to administer local authorities, suspension 
or dismissal of councillors for transgressions.
12
 
While the exercise of all supervisory powers has significant consequences on local autonomy, 
this study is limited to the power to issue policy directives. The 2013 Constitution has vested 
local authorities with some measure of local autonomy to enable them to be responsive and 
                                                          
7
 Machingauta N (2010) 140. 
8
 Machingauta N (2010) 140. 
9
 Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15]. 
10
 Mutema EP ‘Debating the implications of the Urban Councils Act Chapter 29.15 (1996) on the practice of good 
corporate governance in Zimbabwe’s urban local authorities 2012 International Journal of Asian Social Science 
2085. 
11
 Zhou G ‘Legal and Institutional Framework: The “Achilles Heel” of local authorities and Raison D’etre of 
Ministerial intervention in Zimbabwe’ 2012 Journal of Public Administration and Governance 23.  
12
 Urban Councils Act, s314.  
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accountable to citizens.
13
 The question is whether the exercise of power to issue policy directives 
in terms of section 313 is consistent with the normative framework that will be proposed in 
chapter two and whether it is constituent with the 2013 Constitution? 
1.2 Significance of the problem 
 
As mentioned above, supervision of local authorities by the central government is important for a 
number of reasons including to promote the realisation of national and local goals such as 
efficient and effective delivery of public services to the people. The UCA gives the national 
government various supervisory powers for that purpose. Policy directives are one of the major 
tools used by the national government to ensure that the activities of local authorities are in line 
with national policies and objectives. When exercising the power to issue policy directives it is 
important that the national government does not undermine the minimum level of local 
autonomy. Local autonomy is vital if urban local authorities are to deliver on their 
developmental mandates. If a certain measure of local autonomy is not guaranteed, then urban 
local authorities are unlikely to respond to the needs and preferences of their communities. 
Instead, urban local authorities are likely to be more accountable to the national government at 
the expense of the local people. Thus, it is important that supervisory powers, such as the power 
to issue policy directives, are exercised in such a way which does not undermine the necessary 
minimum level of local autonomy and local accountability. 
1.3 Research question 
 
The importance of local autonomy for service delivery and development at the local level has 
been stressed above. The 2013 Constitution has recognised the importance of local autonomy by 
                                                          
13
 Constitution of Zimbabwe, s276. 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
giving local authorities „right to govern‟ their communities and with „all‟ the powers to do so. 
The question is whether section 313 of the UCA which gives the Minister responsible for local 
government the power to issue policy directives is in line with the normative framework which 
will be proposed in chapter two and whether it is consistent with the new constitutional 
framework? In seeking to answer this main question the study will provide answers to the 
following sub-questions: 
What does the concept of supervision entail?  
Why is the adequate use of the instrument of policy directives important? 
What are the boundaries of section 313 as set out in the UCA? 
What is the impact of the incorrect use of powers to issue policy directives on local autonomy, 
local accountability and service delivery?  
1.4 Research methodology 
 
This is a desktop based study which will analyse relevant books and chapters in books relating to 
supervision of local governments by national and other higher level governments. It will also 
examine legislation, journal articles, newspaper articles and press statements in the field of 
multi-level government. The study will examine three Ministerial directives in chapter four. Due 
to challenges in accessing government policies the study will assess two directives that the 
author has on file. The study will rely on secondary sources such as newspaper articles for the 
third directive.  
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1.5 Literature survey 
 
It is often argued that local government (local authorities) is the level of government physically 
closest to the people.
14
 It is the tier of government created to bring government to the grassroots 
and to give the grassroots population a sense of involvement in the processes that affect their 
daily lives.
15
 Local government all over the world provides basic services that contribute to the 
well-being of individuals and communities.
16
  In Zimbabwe, urban local authorities have not 
been able to deliver basic services effectively and deliver on their overall development mandate 
due to a number of challenges.  
Some scholars attribute this lack of effectiveness to the unlimited supervisory powers which the 
Minister responsible for local government enjoys under various local government Acts.
17
 Zhou, 
for example, argues that the problem is the wording of local government laws which allows wide 
interpretation and therefore giving the Minister wide powers.
18
 Referring to the old constitutional 
order, Chirisa & Jonga remarked that the Constitution is not explicit on the definition of the 
powers of the Minister. 
19
 They further argue that the powers of the Minister are not clearly 
defined in the Constitution and had they been clearly defined there could not be a lot of 
tampering with the systems, structures and operations of local government.
20
 This view is 
supported by Machingauta who is of the view that the current legislation on local government 
                                                          
14
 Council of Europe European Charter of local self-government (1995). 
15
 See Chirisa I & Jonga W ‘Urban Local Governance in the Crucible: Empirical Overtones of Central Government 
Meddling in Local Urban Councils Affairs in Zimbabwe’ 2009 Theoretical and Empirical Researchers in Urban 
Management 169.  
16
 European charter (1995).   
17
 Constitution Watch ‘Giving Effect to the New Constitution: Local Government: Ministers, Mayors and Money’ 
Zimbabwe Situation available at 2 October 2013. 
18
 Zhou G (2012) 20. 
19
 Chirisa I & & Jonga W (2009) 178. 
20
 Chirisa I & & Jonga W (2009) 178. 
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grants unfettered powers to the Minister of Local Government.
21
 More so, Jonga argues that 
some of the problems that are faced in the local government can be related to unfettered 
interference in local authorities by central government.
22
 In contrast, Chakaipa is of the view that 
the legal framework regulating urban local authorities is adequate.
23
 He claims that the national 
government has put in place the necessary legal framework and institutional arrangements to 
operationalise a local government system.
24
 
Nonetheless, scholars generally agree that an effective regulatory framework is necessary to 
provide local government with sufficient powers, protect its autonomy, and enhance its 
capacities and administration.
25
 Madzivanyika argues that a well regulated environment protects 
the powers and independence of local government from interference by higher levels of 
government.
26
 De Visser argues that: „if local government does not have sufficient and real 
powers, it cannot enlarge people‟s choice by being responsive to their needs (and thereby 
improve their well-being). Instead, it is constrained in having to work within a limited mandate 
without room for initiative‟.27 Thus, local government autonomy is vital for local accountability 
and responsive local governance at large. 
It is acknowledged that a lot has been written about the disagreements pertaining to the adequacy 
or inadequacy of the legal framework that governs local government in Zimbabwe. They are still 
                                                          
21
 Machingauta N (2010) 150. 
22
 Jonga W (20 14) 75. 
23
 Chakaipa S ‘Local government institutions and elections’ in De Visser J, Steytler N and Machingauta N (eds.) Local 
government reform in Zimbabwe: A policy dialogue (2010) 32. 
24
 Chakaipa S 2010(32). 
25
 Chatiza K ‘Can local government steer socio-economic transformation in Zimbabwe? Analysing historical trends 
and gazing into the future’ in De Visser J et al (eds.) Local government reform in Zimbabwe: A policy dialogue 
(2010) 22.  
26
 Madzivanyika L The impact of weaknesses in Urban Councils Act on efficient and effective service delivery in 
urban councils in Zimbabwe (unpublished LLM thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2011) 9.  
27
 De Visser J (2005) 127.  
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unresolved debates on whether the legislative framework vests unlimited powers on the Minister 
responsible for local government.  It is also acknowledged that a lot has been written about other 
forms of supervision of local authorities in Zimbabwe, but not much has been written on the 
power of the Minister to issue policy directives. This study seeks to fill this gap by examining the 
power of the Minister to issue policy directives.  
1.6 Chapter outline 
 
The study is divided into five chapters. Chapter one introduces the study. It provides an outline 
of basic components of the study (background of the study, research problem, research questions, 
significance of the study, and methodology). Chapter two discusses the components of the 
concept of supervision focusing particularly on the component of regulation. It provides reasons 
why it is vital that local governments be supervised. Furthermore, the chapter will propose a 
normative framework within which section 313 of the UCA will be examined. Chapter three 
provides a brief description of system of local government in Zimbabwe. Chapter four examines 
the power to issue policy directives under section 313 of the UCA in light of a proposed 
normative framework and the Constitution. Chapter five provides major conclusions and 
recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE MEANING OF SUPERVISION: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In recent years, a number of countries around the world have decentralised power to lower 
governments for several reasons.
28
 The major reason for decentralisation is that government is 
more effective when it is closer to the people.
29
 To enable efficiency and self-governance of local 
governments, central governments embarked on decentralisation strategies; recognising 
autonomy of local authorities in their Constitutions.
30
 The previous chapter discussed the 
importance of local autonomy. It was mentioned that for local government to effectively provide 
services that enhance the well-being of citizens, the higher governments must respect the 
autonomy of local governments.
31
 Local government should be bestowed with administrative and 
fiscal autonomy to realise the provision of efficient services.  More so, autonomy will need to be 
complemented with a clearly defined and legally protected framework and democratic 
institutions. However, all that is mentioned above is not sufficient; to realise the national 
objectives there is need of some degree of supervision of the local government activities by 
higher levels of government.
32
 It is argued that „uncontrolled use of autonomy leads to 
fragmentation and unleashes some of the dangers to development harboured by 
decentralisation‟.33 
                                                          
28
 Smoke P ‘Decentralisation in Africa: Goals, dimensions, myths and challenges’ (2003) 23 Public Administration 
and Development 1. 
29
 De Visser J (2007) 24. 
30
 Smoke P (2003)1. 
31
 De Visser J (2005) 43. 
32
 See Bardhan P & Mookhergee D Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries: A Comparative 
Perspective (2006) 9. 
33
 De Visser J (2005) 3. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to provide a normative framework against section 313 of the 
Urban Councils Act will be examined. The chapter provides a brief discussion of the concept of 
supervision before assessing the benefits and challenges of decentralisation. It will be argued that 
lower governments should be supervised to curb the problems harboured by decentralisation. 
The chapter will also discuss the forms of supervision. 
2.2 Defining supervision 
 
Simply put, supervision refers to the „task of overseeing the activities and the conduct of another 
and making certain that everything is done correctly‟.34 Steytler and De Visser define supervision 
as including four distinct but interrelated activities which are regulation, monitoring, support and 
intervention.
35
 In the context of local government, a distinction is made between two forms of 
supervision; legal supervision and functional supervision. In most European countries, legal 
supervision is widespread, whereas functional control is more evident in the North American 
systems.
36
 
Legal supervision is restricted to supervising the performance of local authorities when 
performing their obligations as prescribed by law, as well as the legality of their administrative 
activity.
37
 Higher governments may thus not interfere in local affairs when local governments are 
exercising their discretion lawfully. On the other hand functional supervision deals with matters 
falling within the transferred sphere. Local governments in most countries are not only vested 
with powers to perform functions in their own sphere of competence; they also perform functions 
                                                          
34
 Waite M & Hawker S (eds) Oxford Paperback Dictionary and Thesaurus (2
nd
) (2007) 934. 
35
 Steytler N and De Visser J Local Government Law of South Africa (2007) 15-5. See Steytler N ‘Introduction’ in The 
place and role of local government in federal systems in Steytler N(ed.) (2005) 7. See Machingauta N (2010) 141. 
See also De Visser J (2007) 43. 
36
 Harbich J ‘State supervision of local government authorities’ (2009) VII (4) JEL 55. 
37
 Harbich J (2009) 55. 
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that have been transferred to them. In matters falling within the transferred sphere, state 
supervision goes beyond legal supervision and extends to the exercise of municipal discretion. 
This means that the supervising authorities have the right under certain conditions to intervene 
by way of directive in the exercise of administrative discretion by the municipalities.
38
 
Supervision in the local government spectrum can be distinguished from the concept of 
cooperation. Supervision of local government suggests a hierarchical relationship; whereas 
cooperation refers to a relationship of equality where the actors in intergovernmental relations 
operate as equal partners.
39
 The principle of cooperation requires a normative framework, 
instruments for intergovernmental relations and systems and procedures for vertical and 
horizontal integration of policies.
40
 
2.3 Which level of government should supervise local government? 
 
Supervision of local governments varies in different countries; depending on whether a country 
is a federal or unitary state. In most countries, local government is supervised by „superior‟ 
levels of government.
41
 There is a debate currently with regard to who should be charged with 
supervision of local government. There are three broad categories of supervisors as will be 
shown in this study.  
In one category, which is in federal and quasi-federal states, supervision is carried out solely by 
the regions/states/provincial government and this includes countries such as Australia, Austria, 
Brazil, Canada and Germany.
42
 In the context of South Africa, Machingauta is of the view that it 
                                                          
38
 Harbich J (2009) 57. 
39
 See De Visser J (2005) 5. 
40
 De Visser J (2005) 5. 
41
 Steytler N (2005) 7. 
42
 Sansom G ‘Commonwealth of Australia’ in Steytler N (ed.) A global dialogue on federalism: Local government 
and Metropolitan regions in federal system (2009) 2. See also Kiefer A & Schausberger F ‘Republic of Austria’ in 
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is largely the responsibility of the provincial government; being closer to the local government to 
supervise.
43
 In another class of countries, it is the responsibility of both the central/national and 
provincial governments to supervise local governments. Steytler highlighted that a key feature of 
the South African system of decentralisation is the extensive supervision that both the national 
and provincial governments exercise over municipalities.
44
 In South Africa, the national 
government sets the framework and the provincial government exercises primary supervision.
45
  
The third category comprises unitary states where local governments primarily are supervised by 
the central government. Japan is a good example. Despite the attempt to decentralise power to 
the local governments through the Decentralisation Act and the Decentralisation Reform 
Promotion Act, Mastui argues that many of the tasks of local government are the tasks of the 
central government, and the local government exercises the tasks under the supervision of the 
central government.
46
 Zimbabwe is also an example, where the central government is charged 
with the supervision of local government.
47
 
The following section will discuss the concept of decentralisation, focusing on its benefits and 
pitfalls.  The section will further discuss the supervisory mechanisms that can be used by the 
higher governments to reduce the pitfalls associated with decentralisation. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Steytler N (ed.) A global dialogue on federalism: Local government and Metropolitan regions in federal system 
(2009) 54. See also De Queiroz Ribeiro L & Pinto S G B ‘Brazil’ in Steytler N (ed.) A global dialogue on federalism: 
Local government and Metropolitan regions in federal system (2009) 93. 
43
 See Machingauta N (2010) 140. 
44
 See Steytler N (2005) 202. 
45
 See Steytler N (2005) 7.  
46
 Matsui S The Constitution of Japan: A Contextual Analysis (2011) 33. 
47
 Machingauta N (2010) 140 
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2.4 Decentralisation 
 
According to Mawhood, decentralisation „occurs when national government shares some of its 
power with other groups, particularly those that are either geographically dispersed, or are 
responsible for specific functions, or are given jurisdiction over specified physical locations.‟48 
Power can be transferred through the three main forms of decentralisation namely 
deconcentration, devolution and delegation.
49
 Each form of decentralisation has different 
characteristics, policy implications and conditions of success.
50
 The fundamental areas in the 
decentralisation process are power, authority and responsibility which start from the centre and 
transferred to the lower levels of government.
51
 
Decentralisation appears to be motivated by political concerns, the need to improve service 
delivery to large populations, democratisation and development.
52
 The potential benefits of 
decentralisation revolve around the argument that proximity not only makes it easier for local 
communities to hold public officials liable for their performance; but it facilitates acquisition of 
more accurate information of conditions which could be used for planning and provision of 
services.
53
 
As has been highlighted above, decentralisation can contribute to improved service delivery in 
local governments through many ways. However, decentralisation is not a linear or consistent 
                                                          
48
 Mawhood P Local Government in the Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa (2nd) (1984) 4. See also 
Falleti T G ‘A sequential theory of decentralization and its effects on the intergovernmental balance of power: Latin 
American cases in comparative perspective’ 2005 American Political Science Review 328. 
49
 De Visser (2005) 14-15.  
50
 Litvack J & Seddon J (eds) ‘Decentralization Briefing Notes’ (1999) 2. 
51
 Mawhood P (1984) 18. 
52
 Litvack J & Seddon J (1999) 6. 
53
 See Bardhan P & Mookhergee D (2006) 7. See also Litvack J & Seddon J (1999) 2. 
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process; it can have its own problems.
54
  There are some important factors that have a negative 
bearing on the success of decentralisation. In this study corruption, lack of capacity and inequity 
will be discussed. It will be argued that for decentralisation to be successful, some measure of 
oversight of the performance and compliance of local authorities is crucial. 
2.4.1 Benefits of decentralisation 
 
2.4.1.1 Decentralisation improves democracy 
 
The argument in favour of decentralisation of power is that citizens and their elected 
representatives are given more power in public decision-making.
55
 With decentralisation, local 
government officials are likely to be better informed about the preferences of local citizens. 
Decentralisation may promote democratisation by giving citizens or their representatives more 
influence in formulating and implementing policies.
56
 Turner is of the view that though the 
decentralisation of power to territorial units is given varying degrees of constitutional status in 
different countries.
 57
 It has been adopted as part of the democratisation process in all regions of 
the world
58
. It has also been adopted as a response to pressures from spatially defined minority 
groups from a measure of self-determination.
59
 
Bardhan and Mookhergee argue that the most remarkable achievement of the Brazilian 
decentralisation pertains to patterns of popular participation in certain categories.
60
 Baiocchi 
argues that the decentralisation of powers in Brazil „created an opportunity for local governments 
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to introduce democratic innovations such as participatory budgeting.‟61 The purpose of widening 
the scope and fairness of a democracy is to promote objectives of accountability and 
responsiveness of policy concerning delivery of local public goods and services to citizens.
62
 
2.4.1.2 Decentralisation promotes development 
 
De Visser argues that development comprises three processes, namely the satisfaction of material 
needs, the enhancement of choice and the equitable distribution of wealth.
63
 He further argues 
that the threefold definition guides the assessment of what decentralisation can contribute to 
development.
64
 Every country needs development, and local government as being the level of 
government physically closer to the communities can contribute to local economic development 
in a number of ways. Decentralisation promotes development in the sense that it will improve 
preference-matching and enables greater participation in the state affairs by the citizens.
65
 
Decentralisation may lead to more creative, innovative and responsive programmes by allowing 
local experimentation which is good for development.
66
 In addition, decentralisation of powers 
can have a direct impact on the distribution of resources. Most local governments have distinct 
needs and preferences for local public goods and services. Central governments without the help 
of the lower level of government may fail to provide to the different needs due to lack of 
information of those needs and preferences.
67
 Thus, if resources are to be distributed to the lower 
level of government, there is a likelihood that the resources will reach every community. Hence, 
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from the above mentioned, one can conclude that decentralisation can indeed make significant 
contributions to development.
68
 
2.4.1.3 Decentralisation accommodates diversity 
 
Decentralisation is instrumental in protecting and promoting cultural diversity which in turn, 
enriches participatory and pluralist democracy. Singiza and De Visser argue that although 
vesting ethnically defined local government units with strong autonomous powers would 
exacerbate ethnic tensions and contribute to national disintegration; neglecting the wishes of an 
identifiable ethnic and/or cultural group may also lead to demoralisation and alienation.
69
 
According to Dabo et al, „decentralisation can shift the onus from conflict to negotiations and 
bargaining which demilitarises volatile, conflict situations while extending state authority in 
contested areas, areas of weak penetration or those in the hands of local war lords.‟70 When 
minority groups are provided with some measure of autonomy, tension and conflict between the 
minority and majority groups will be reduced, thus contributing to safeguarding and 
strengthening internal peace.
71
 Thus, decentralisation can lead to the creation of peaceful and 
self-governed ethnic region states and local governments.
72
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A number of countries experimented with different methods to respond to challenges that are 
associated with the ethnic, racial, religious, or other diversity of their people.
73
 Different methods 
were used, depending on the particular objective they sought to achieve. Methods used to deal 
with the ethnic diversity included decentralisation of powers to ethnic groups. In the case of 
Ethiopia, the authorities selected to achieve two principal purposes through the decentralisation 
programme namely, to achieve development and to respond to the ethnic diversity of its people.
74
 
2.4.2 Pitfalls of decentralisation 
 
2.4.2.1 Disparities 
 
De Visser argues that one of the most underestimated negative effects of decentralisation is that 
it ignores and, in effect, stimulates regional disparities.
75
 He further argues that disparities 
between regions are present in the world over.
76
 Decentralisation creates more opportunities for 
local autonomy and responsiveness to the needs of communities, but it may also lead to regional 
disparities. According to De Visser, disparities „are caused by the hubs of economic activity and 
by the consequences thereof, namely increasing urbanisation.‟ 77  Because of pleasant living 
conditions, high salaries, level of infrastructure and good services in wealthier regions, people 
often migrate from poor rural areas to urban areas, which is likely to increase interregional 
income disparities.
78
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In the case of Brazil, despite formal mechanisms to reduce regional inequalities, inequality has 
persisted and even grown among municipalities of different sizes and in different regions and the 
situation is significantly worse in smaller municipalities.
79
 Smaller municipalities tend to be 
more dependent on central government transfers and the situation is worse in the less 
economically developed areas. Taxes raised in the smaller municipalities are being used to 
privilege the developed urban areas.
80
 Thus, for the intended results of decentralisation to 
materialise, there is a need for the higher governments to set regulations that levels the playing 
field for sub national entities. More so, higher governments can help maintain equity in spending 
across jurisdictions by monitoring public expenditures and supporting local government with 
financial resources when need arises. The central government can also help to reduce regional 
disparities by increasing intergovernmental transfers, carrying out several waves of national 
poverty alleviation program, and other measures.  
2.4.2.2 Lack of capacity 
 
The intended outcomes of decentralisation are more likely to succeed where local authorities 
have both managerial and financial capacity to perform the task.
81
 In most developing countries 
there is a mismatch between the decentralised responsibilities and human and financial 
capacity.
82
 Due to the shortage of appropriately qualified personnel, decentralisation may result 
in the provision of lower quality goods and services at local level than may be obtained at the 
central level where skilled personnel are more readily available.
83
A decentralised local entity can 
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realise its mission only if there is balance between the assigned missions and the needed human 
and financial capacities. When powers are decentralised, local governments will have to be 
equipped with trained, competent people in order to carry out new responsibilities, as the success 
of decentralisation heavily depends on proper training for both national and local officials in 
decentralised administration.
84
 
Local capacity is one of the most important and challenging factors in creating a well-
functioning, decentralised government.
85
 There is need for the higher governments to monitor the 
performance of local officials. Where the officials are failing to perform on their obligations, 
higher levels of government can have supporting mechanisms like capacity-building and 
secondment of staff which will help to strengthen local capacity.
86
 
2.4.2.3 Corruption 
 
Schmidt argues that „decentralisation has resulted in decentralisation of corruption.‟87 Corruption 
manifests itself through tender fraud, nepotism, favouritism, lack of accountability and bribes.
88
 
Prud‟Homme argues that corruption is more likely to be widespread at decentralised levels 
because proximity is a fertile ground for elite capture.
89
 Bardhan and Mookherge refer to the 
vulnerability of local governments to be one of the reasons why corruption is rampant at local 
level.
90
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Local governments in most countries are agencies of the national government in the matters of 
collection of taxes, law enforcement, and other governmental functions. More so, they are often 
the cornerstone of development and are vested with some degree of autonomy. Owing to the fact 
that local governments often have some measure of autonomy, some central governments are 
reluctant to monitor local compliance with the rules, regulations, policies and institutional 
instruments. Where the is lack of supervision from the higher levels of government, there will be 
a high risk of local authorities illegally diverting funds allocated to specific public activities for 
personal gains. The success of decentralisation is closely related to compliance with the policies 
and institutional instruments that regulates the decentralised powers. Without some central 
supervision, there can be no assurance that functions of national importance are adequately 
performed once they have been decentralised. Uncontrolled use of autonomy adversely affects 
decentralisation. Thus, it is vital that the central government supervise the local government to 
ensure that they are complying with the rules and regulations and they are performing their 
functions.
91
 
This section discussed the benefits and pitfalls of decentralisation. It was argued that for 
decentralisation to yield the desired outcomes, checks and balances must be put in place to 
regulate, monitor, and/or support local governments when exercising their powers and 
performing their functions. The following section will discuss the forms of supervision. 
2.5 Forms of supervision 
 
The first section of the chapter defined the concept of supervision and highlighted that 
supervision includes four distinct but interrelated activities which are regulation, monitoring, 
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support and intervention.
92
 This section will discuss these forms of supervision. Regulation is 
more relevant to this study. 
2.5.1 Regulation 
 
According to De Visser, regulation refers to setting frameworks within which local autonomy 
can be exercised responsibly.
93
 Baldwin, Scott and Hood state that „regulation refers to the 
promulgation of an authoritative set of rules, accompanied by some mechanism, typically a 
public agency, for monitoring and promoting compliance with these rules.‟94 Higher levels of 
governments often establish regulatory frameworks, setting the parameters within which one 
level of government should operate. Since regulatory frameworks may significantly influence the 
mandates of local governments, it is submitted that a balance needs should be struck between 
need for supervision and requirement for local discretion. It is against that backdrop, that the 
study proposes an effective regulatory framework. Such a framework does not extend to the core 
of how local governments must perform. It must be predictable and accommodate differences at 
local government level. More so, the regulators will need to ensure participation by the local 
government in the determination of the framework. Last, the administrative and implementation 
costs must be must be deliberated upon when establishing the framework. This section of the 
study will discuss each of the above-proposed elements of the regulatory framework. 
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2.5.1.1 National framework 
 
A framework is defined as the basic, underlying structure to a set of regulations.
95
 The 
framework does not need to extend to the core of the matter, but rather deal with the structure 
within which local government is to exercise the powers. In other words, the regulatory 
framework must set the essential national standards.
96
 The framework for example must list the 
objectives of the regulating authority, functions of local governments and determine the 
procedures and processes to be followed by the local governments when exercising their powers. 
The framework must not give a detailed explanation on how local governments are to perform 
the functions. It must only be limited to setting the structure. If the framework over regulates, 
there is a likelihood that it will compromise or impede a local government‟s ability or right to 
exercise its powers or perform its functions in an autonomous manner. 
2.5.1.2 Regulatory framework must be predictable 
 
A regulatory framework must be reasonably predictable. A continuously changing regulatory 
framework, just like a continuously changing environment is harmful for local government‟s 
ability to achieve optimal service delivery.
97
 The framework will need to set the objectives. 
Objectives are critical for those who are acting within the parameters set by the regulations, since 
they represent the criteria against which they must determine the appropriate regulatory action; 
and against which they will be held accountable.
98
 They also need to be clear to those being 
regulated and other interested parties. Legal certainty is a quality of the law connoting that legal 
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subjects can ascertain what the law allows them to do, what it prohibits, and what is likely to 
happen as a result of their legal and illegal actions.
99
 
2.5.1.3 Regulatory framework must accommodate differences of local government 
 
The regulatory framework needs to be able to accommodate differences at the local level. In a 
number of countries, local government is divided into categories. The categorisation of local 
governments entails that there are different needs and preferences.
100
 Thus, there is a need for 
higher governments to set standards which will enable local governments with different needs 
and preferences to undertake the roles and functions allocated to them. Failure to take into 
account the differences at local level may result in provision of low quality services by the 
smaller and financially unstable municipalities. 
2.5.1.4 Participation by local government in determination of the rules 
 
Good practice indicates that when a decision to be taken has a likelihood of adversely affecting 
an institution or an organisation; the interested parties must be consulted.
101
 The process must be 
inclusive and facilitate appropriate and effective participation of local government. Participation 
by the local government in the determination of the framework is not only in line with 
democratic ideals; it is also the cornerstone upon which the local governments will be able to be 
account to the communities. One can argue that decisions that are made after consultations with 
local governments will be better informed and more applicable to diverse interest of local 
governments than those made only by the central government.
102
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2.5.1.5 Cost of complying with the regulatory framework 
 
The process of standard setting must consider the administration costs and impact the standards 
will have on the local governments. A regulatory framework that has an effect of burdening the 
financial standing of local government should be avoided at all costs.
103
 The central question 
when making a decision to regulate must be whether the benefits that will flow from the 
regulation will outweigh the costs of that regulation?
104
 If the answer will be in the affirmative, 
then higher governments should regulate. 
The section discussed the supervision of local governments by establishing a regulatory 
framework. The study highlighted that the regulatory framework must be limited to setting the 
parameters within which the local government should perform their functions. It was also argued 
that an appropriate regulatory framework is predictable; enables participation of local 
government and takes into account the diverse needs and aspirations of local governments. In 
addition, it was highlighted that there is a need for a framework that does not create unnecessary 
financial burden on the local government.
105
 
2.5.2 Monitoring 
 
Monitoring is another form of supervision. Central governments must monitor local authorities 
to ensure compliance with law, regulations, policies and performance standards. Machingauta 
argues that monitoring relates to the establishment of mechanisms aimed at continuously looking 
into the general performance of local government, to see whether there is compliance with the 
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relevant legislation.
106
 The monitoring of local government by the other levels of government is 
necessary in order to pick up early signals of problems that require intervention by the 
appropriate authority.
107
 A monitoring framework can include certain measures or tests at 
intervals to see whether local governments are complying with the national legislation.
108
 To 
enable monitoring, local governments should play an important role by cooperating with national 
and provincial governments to exercise its monitoring function within the legislative parameters.  
There are several mechanisms of monitoring which include the right to access council records by 
the higher governments, self-reporting by the local authorities, requests for information and 
investigations.
109
 
2.5.3 Support 
 
Another form of supervision is support. Waite and Hawker define support as: to carry all or part 
of the weight; to enable to last out; give strength to and encourage.
110
 Steytler and De Visser 
distinguish between two types of support, which is support in the context of supervision and 
support in the context of co-operation.
111
 Support in the context of supervision is there to prevent 
a decline in structure of the local government.
112
 Support of local governments in the context of 
co-operation is where local government will be an equal partner in the achievement of a common 
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national goal.
113
 Other levels of government must support local government whilst respecting the 
autonomy of local government. 
In the context of South Africa, the national and provincial government has a duty to support and 
strengthen the capacity of municipalities to manage their own affairs, to exercise their powers 
and to perform their functions.
114
 This support not only involves the delivery of actual 
infrastructure and support services to communities on behalf of municipalities, it also includes 
direct and indirect support to municipalities including technical support, capacity building and 
support in the area of governance. 
2.5.4 Intervention 
 
Hoffman‐Wanderer & Murray argue that intervention is the most intrusive form of 
supervision.
115
 Where there are procedures to be followed when intervening into the affairs of 
the local government, if they are not followed there is likelihood that intervention will undermine 
the autonomy of local government.
116
 Intervention can be exercised in various ways. In the 
context of South Africa, intervention can be exercised through the issuing of a directive, 
assumption of responsibility and dissolution of the municipal council, among others.
117
 
In many jurisdictions the central government may intervene in local authorities‟ affairs in terms 
of the constitution of their respective country, or by constitutionally compatible legislation.
118
 
Legislation must clearly provide when intervention is the appropriate step to take when 
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supervising local government. When the legislation is unclear with regard to when intervention 
can be triggered, the disciplinary responses from the higher governments can be numerous. In the 
case of Uganda, the policies are not backed up with sanctions.
119
According to Azfar, Livingstone 
& Meagher, owing to the fact that the central government does not back policies with sanctions, 
when a local government underperforms in a key sector, the disciplinary measures are 
numerous.
120
 Azfar, Livingstone & Meagher stated that the disciplinary responses range from 
suspension or dismissal of the responsible bureaucrat to investigation by national authorities.
121
 
Where there is no clear framework on when and how the central government can intervene, there 
is always a danger of undermining the autonomy of local authorities.  
For local autonomy not to be undermined firstly the law should provide for a system of checks 
and balances before an intervention becomes a necessity. Integral to this would be mechanisms 
for improved monitoring, an early-warning system and strengthened means for 
intergovernmental oversight and support measures. Secondly, the mechanisms used to intervene 
into local governments must be reviewable in court. Finally, when the interests have been 
resolved, intervention must be terminated.
122
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the chapter highlighted that supervision has four distinct but interrelated activities 
which are regulation, monitoring, support and intervention. The benefits and the pitfalls of 
decentralisation were also discussed. It was highlighted that owing to the fact that 
decentralisation is not a linear process; supervision of the local government by central 
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government is significant for the success of any decentralisation strategy. Furthermore, the 
chapter proposed a normative framework which higher governments must adhere to when setting 
regulatory frameworks for local governments. It was discussed that for the autonomy of local 
government not to be undermined, an effective regulatory framework must be limited to the 
structure of how local governments must perform; the regulatory must be predictable and must 
accommodate differences at local government level. More so, the regulators will need to ensure 
participation by the local government in the determination of the framework. The administrative 
and implementation costs associated with complying with the framework must be deliberated 
upon when setting the framework.  
Chapter two has provided a normative regulatory within which local government must be 
supervised. Chapter three will provide a case study of Zimbabwe. It is against the above-
mentioned framework that the power of the Minister to issue policy directives provided for on 
section 313 of the Urban Councils Act will be examined in Chapter four to decide whether it 
exceeds the normative framework.  
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CHAPTER 3: LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN ZIMBABWE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Local government is an integral part of the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe.
123
 For the first time 
in the history of Zimbabwe, local government is no longer a mere creature of central government 
but a tier of government.
124
 As highlighted in chapter one, the Constitution guarantees the right 
of each local authority to govern, on its own initiative, the local affairs of the people within the 
area for which it has been established, subject to the Constitution and national legislation.
125
 It 
further provides that a local authority has all the powers necessary to govern, subject to the 
Constitution and national legislation.
126
 The Constitution which seems to guarantee autonomy of 
local authorities also provides for an Act of Parliament to establish powers of local authorities. 
Chapter two provided a normative framework within which section 313 of the UCA
 
will be 
examined. The chapter provided a brief discussion of the concept of supervision. It was argued 
that for decentralisation to be successful, it is necessary that lower governments be supervised. In 
particular, chapter three will focus on the history, the status, powers and functions of urban local 
authorities and the institutions responsible for supervising urban local authorities. 
3.2 General overview of Zimbabwe 
 
The 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe replaced the 1979 Lancaster House Constitution. The 
Lancaster House Constitution is a product of the negotiations between the British government, 
the Patriotic Front (led by Robert Mugabe‟s Zimbabwe African National Union [ZANU], Joshua 
                                                          
123
 Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
124
 See Constitution of Zimbabwe, s5. 
125
 Constitution of Zimbabwe, s276. 
126
 Constitution of Zimbabwe, s276. 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
Nkomo‟s Zimbabwe African Peoples Union [ZAPU]), and the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government 
(represented by Abel Muzorewa and Ian Smith).
127
 Lancaster House Constitution was deficient 
in many respects „because of its compromised, undemocratic origins and because of the 
governmental imbalance that had resulted from frequent amendments‟.128 The adoption of a 2013 
Constitution was a key requirement of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) signed in 
September 2008 by the three political parties in Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe African National Union-
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), and the two formations of the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC), namely, the MDC-T led by Morgan Tsvangirai, and the MDC-N led by Welshman 
Ncube.
129
 The Constitution officially came into force on 22 May 2013 after an overwhelming 
approval at a constitutional referendum held on 16 and 17 March 2013. The Constitution seeks to 
address the irregularities that had been observed during the tenure of the Lancaster House 
Constitution.
130
 For this thesis, it is particularly relevant that the 2013 constitution seeks to 
democratise the political landscape through decentralisation.
131
 The previous constitutional order 
was characterised by over-centralisation of power, including the unlimited supervisory powers of 
the Minister.
132
 The Constitution is one of the few constitutions that expressly provides for the 
judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights.
133
The Constitution also establishes a new 
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Constitutional Court which is the highest court in all constitutional matters and has the powers to 
declare any act or legislation unconstitutional.
134
  
Furthermore, the Constitution provides for a Parliament which is tasked with protecting the 
Constitution and promoting democratic governance.
135
 Parliament has powers to ensure that the 
provisions of the Constitution are upheld and that the State and all institutions and agencies of 
government at every level act constitutionally and in the national interest.
136
 All institutions and 
agencies of the state and government at every level are accountable to the Parliament.
137
 
3.3 System of government 
 
Zimbabwe is a unitary, democratic and sovereign state.
138
 The government is constituted by the 
national government; provincial and metropolitan councils; and local authorities.
139
 This section 
of the study will briefly discuss each tier of government.  
3.3.1 National government 
 
The national government is divided into three branches; the legislature, executive and the 
judiciary. The legislature consists of Parliament and the President.
140
 The legislative authority is 
derived from the people and is vested in the legislature which it must exercises in accordance 
with the Constitution.
141
 The legislature is bestowed with the powers to amend the Constitution, 
to make laws for the peace, order and good governance of Zimbabwe. It may confer subordinate 
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legislative powers upon another body or authority in accordance with section 134 of the 
Constitution.
142
 The judiciary authority is derived from the people and is vested in the courts.
143
 
The Constitution vests the President with executive authority, who exercises it in accordance 
with the Constitution. The President delegates executive authority to Cabinet Ministers who are 
responsible for overseeing various sectoral areas.
144
 One of the Ministers relevant to this 
discussion is the Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (MLRUB) who 
is responsible for supervising local government in Zimbabwe. 
3.3.2 Provincial government 
 
Zimbabwe is divided into eight non-metropolitan provinces and two provinces with a 
metropolitan status.
145
 Each non-metropolitan province is under the political leadership of the 
chairperson (previously known as the provincial governor), elected by the provincial council.
146
 
Harare metropolitan province is under the leadership of the Mayor of Harare and Bulawayo 
metropolitan province is led by the Mayor of Bulawayo.
147
 Both non-metropolitan and 
metropolitan provinces are responsible for social and economic development of their respective 
province including; planning and implementing social and economic development activities, 
promotion of tourism, management of natural resources, coordination and implementation of 
governmental programmes and monitoring and evaluation of the use of resources.
148
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3.3.3 Local government 
 
Local government is divided into rural and urban local authorities.
149
 Urban local authorities 
represent and manage the affairs of people in urban areas and rural local authorities are tasked 
with representing and managing the affairs of people in the rural areas.
150
 Local authority areas 
are divided into wards, which are further divided into village assemblies in rural areas. The paper 
will focus particularly on urban local authorities. 
3.4 Urban local government system 
 
3.4.1 Colonial system of local government 
 
The history of formal urban local government in Zimbabwe dates back to 1890, when 
Zimbabwe, (the then Rhodesia) was run by a private company, the British South Africa 
Company (BSACo).
151
 The first formal urban local authority to be set up was the Salisbury 
Sanitation Board in 1891.
152
 The Salisbury Sanitation Board was set up in response to pressure 
from residents of the emerging town who were worried about sanitary conditions and the Board 
was only responsible for refuse removal and management.
153
 The need for similar boards was 
evident in other fast-emerging towns. Building on the experience of Salisbury (now known as 
Harare), other sanitary boards were set up in 1894 in the urban centres of Bulawayo, Mutare and 
Gweru.
154
 These were upgraded to urban councils. 
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Colonial local government legislation was used as a tool to further racial division and the 
exploitation and marginalisation of the majority of Africans for the benefit of the white 
minority.
155
 The system was primarily racist, exploitative and subservient in character.
156
 More 
so, it was based on the principle of „separate development‟ of races, notably whites and blacks, 
with the former benefiting more from the system than the latter.
157
 Urban councils had wide 
resource-raising powers and were relatively autonomous.
158
 
3.4.2 Post-Independence local government 
 
The ZANU PF-led government, immediately after independence sought to introduce wide-
ranging reforms aimed at removing some of the racial considerations of the colonial regime from 
the local government system.
159
 It introduced a set of policies aimed at enabling Africans to own 
immovable property in urban areas.
160
A number of pieces of colonial legislation were either 
amended or repealed, and new directives and statutes were issued.
161
 The government declared 
its intention to promote decentralisation and participation in 1980. The dawn of independence 
saw the creation of a single Local Government Ministry.
162
 More so, the beginning of 
independence saw the amendment of the Urban Councils Act which governs the urban 
councils.
163
 The Urban Councils Act has been changed constantly since independence from the 
UCA (Chapter 214), UCA (Chapter 29:15) and finally to the Local Government Laws 
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Amendment Act, 2008.
164
 Currently, there is an effort to amend the UCA to align it with other 
local government laws and the 2013 Constitution. 
165
 There is currently a Local Authorities Draft 
Bill.
166
 The proposed Bill is intended to unify local government legislation and systematise local 
government.
167
 According to Davies, the „proposed Bill appears to be a largely cut-and-paste 
amalgamation of its predecessors.‟168 
3.4.2.1 Categories of urban councils 
 
In spite of the 2013 Constitution, the organisation of urban local government is still primarily 
provided for in the Urban Councils Act.
169  Urban councils are hierarchically organised into 
classes, based on size and function.
170
 Currently they are thirty-one urban councils in 
Zimbabwe.
171
From highest to lowest, they are cities, municipalities, town councils and local 
boards. They are seven cities, nine municipalities, eleven town councils and four local boards.
172
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Table 1: Classes of the Urban Councils in Zimbabwe 
Cities Municipalities Town Councils Local Boards 
Harare 
Bulawayo 
Gweru 
Kadoma 
Kwekwe 
Masvingo 
Mutare 
Bindura 
Chegutu 
Chinhoyi 
Chitungwiza 
Gwanda 
Marondera 
Redcliff 
Kariba 
Victoria Falls 
Beitbridge 
Chipinge 
Chiredzi 
Gokwe 
Karoi 
Norton 
Rusape 
Shurugwi 
Zvishavane 
Plum Tree 
Lupane 
Chirundu 
Epworth 
Hwange 
Ruwa 
 
 
                                 Source: Moyo S (2014) 15. 
The Urban Councils Act, (sections 4 to 14) empowers the President to establish municipal and 
town councils as well as dividing council areas into wards.
173
 The Act also empowers the 
President to upgrade urban councils from one category to the other i.e. local boards to be 
upgraded to town councils, town councils to municipalities and municipalities to city councils.
174
 
3.4.2.2 Powers and functions of urban councils 
 
The 2013 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the specific powers and functions of local 
authorities. Section 276 of the Constitution provides that local authority powers shall include:  
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‘… the right to govern on its own initiative, the local affairs of the people 
within the area for which it has been established, and shall have all the powers 
necessary for it to do so.’175 
The Constitution further provides that local authorities‟ powers may include powers to make by-
laws and other regulations or rules which are necessary for the effective administration of local 
authorities.
176
 With regard to executive powers, an Act of Parliament may confer executive 
powers on a directly elected mayor or chairperson of an urban local authority.
177
 While the 
Constitution guarantees local authorities the right to govern on its own initiative the affairs of its 
own people, the powers and functions are to be determined by the national government.
178
  
 
Furthermore, the Constitution envisages national government allocating revenue-raising powers 
to local authorities.
179
 Section 276(2) of the Constitution gives Parliament the discretion to enact 
a law conferring powers on local authorities including „a power to levy rates and taxes and 
generally to raise sufficient revenue for them to carry out their objectives and responsibilities‟.180  
The Constitution makes reference to an Act of Parliament to confer functions on local 
authorities.
181
 The existing Act of Parliament that regulates urban local government is the Urban 
Councils Act. The Act provides the powers and functions of urban local authorities. The powers 
range from the core business of the council, which is service provision, to issues to do with 
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allowances, mementoes, and orchestras and bands.
182
 The general powers of urban councils are 
provided in the second schedule of the Act. 
183
 Nonetheless, the powers vested in urban councils 
are matched by even more supervisory powers bestowed on the Minister responsible for local 
government.
184
 
3.5 Institutions charged with supervision of Urban Local Government 
 
As highlighted in Chapter two, for local government to achieve its developmental mandate, some 
degree of supervision by higher levels of government is crucial. In Zimbabwe, there is an array 
of national government institutions charged with the supervision of urban councils.
185
 Central 
government supervises urban authorities through the Ministry of Local Government Rural and 
Urban Development, the Local Government Board, Parliament, the Auditor General and other 
institutions. This section will discuss the role of the Ministry of Local Government
186
 Local 
Government Board
187
, Parliament
188
 and Auditor-General.
189
  
3.5.1 Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development 
 
The primary function of the Ministry of Local Government (MLGUD) is to supervise or monitor 
the activities of local governments and also to monitor the services offered to the public by these 
public institutions.
190
 The MLGUD is responsible for the coordination of all government 
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programmes at sub-national level and administering all local government legislation.
191
 It is 
charged with coordinating policy formulation, implementation and evaluation in the local 
government sector. Furthermore, the Ministry is mandated to lead the development and 
management of the sector, representing its interests at national and district levels in relation to 
other government institutions.
192
 Chakaipa summarises the roles of the Ministry besides 
administering legislation on local government to include, but not limited to, facilitation, advice, 
monitoring, oversight, directing, promoting and capacity building.
193
 
 
The Minister responsible for local government has various powers and obligations under various 
local government Acts. For instance, under the Urban Councils Act the Minister is empowered to 
„direct a council to reverse, suspend or rescind any of its resolutions or decisions if he considers 
that the resolutions or decisions are not in the interest of the inhabitants of the area, or in the 
national or public interest‟.194 More so, in terms of section 313 of the Act, the Minister may give 
councils directives of a general nature on policy which the Minister deems to be in the national 
interests.
195
 The directives are binding and must be complied with expeditiously, notwithstanding 
that the councillors may have reasonable grounds for apprehension about the directives.
196
 These 
powers and levels of discretion given to the Minister over local authorities have generated a lot 
of debate within the local government sector.
197
 That being said; the debate with regard to the 
powers vested in the Minister responsible for local government will be dealt with in chapter four. 
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3.5.2 Local Government Board 
 
The Local Government Board (LGB) is an important institution in urban local government 
management.
198
 It is provided for under section 116 of the Urban Councils Act.
199
 The main role 
of the Board is to provide guidance for the general organisation and control of employees in the 
service of councils.
200
 The appointment and discharge of senior officials, defined in section 131 
as a town clerk, a chamber secretary, a head or deputy, head of a department or such other 
employee of a council as may be prescribed, requires the approval of the LGB.
201
  
 
3.5.3 Parliament 
 
One of the principles of public financial management as provided in the Constitution is that there 
must be transparency and accountability in financial matters.
202
 Section 299 of the Constitution 
vests the Parliament with the oversight powers with regards to state revenues and expenditure.
203
 
Parliament has powers to; 
monitor and oversee expenditure by the state and all commissions and 
institutions and agencies of government at every level, including 
statutory bodies, government-controlled entities, and provincial and 
metropolitan councils and local authorities.
204
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This entails that for each urban local authority to comply with the principles on financial 
management, it has to account for revenue earned and expenditure incurred to the Parliament. 
The Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Local Government (PPCLG) plays an important 
role.
205
 Members of the Committee convene public discussions on pertinent issues that emanate 
from areas of concern to the public and report back to Parliament.
206
 They may discuss issues 
related to the performance of ministries with members of the executive, their officials and the 
public.
207
 Furthermore, members of the PPCLG may demand explanation from ministries if 
work, for which Parliament allocated funds, is not carried out.
208
 The role played by the 
Committee is significant in and at light of accountability at the local level.  
3.5.4 Auditor-General 
 
The 2013 Constitution established the office of the Auditor-General.
209
 Section 309 of the 
Constitution states that the Auditor-General (AG) is required to audit the accounts, financial 
management of all departments, institutions and agencies of government, all provincial and 
metropolitan councils and local authorities.
210
At the request of the government, the AG may 
carry out special audits of the accounts of any statutory body or government-controlled entity.
211
 
More so, he or she can order the taking of measures to rectify any defects in the management and 
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safeguarding of public funds and public property.
212
 The AG may exercise other functions that 
may be conferred to him or her by or under an Act of Parliament.
213
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided a brief description of the system of urban local government in Zimbabwe. 
It spelt out that the Minister responsible for Local Government has supervisory powers which are 
provided for in the Urban Councils Act. The power to issue policy directives has been 
controversial for more than a decade. Some authors argue that the problem is the wording of 
local government laws which allows wide interpretation and therefore giving the Minister too 
wide powers.
214
 Others are of the view that the Minister is exercising powers that go beyond the 
powers under section 313 of the UCA.
215
 Drawing from the normative framework proposed in 
chapter two, chapter four will examine whether the power to issue policy directives as provided 
for in section 313 of the UCA complies with the framework set out in chapter two. The chapter 
will further examine whether section 313 of the UCA is constituent with the 2013 Constitution. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: EXAMINING SECTION 313 OF THE URBAN COUNCILS ACT. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Urban local authorities in Zimbabwe are failing to deliver basic services efficiently and 
effectively.
216
 This is attributed to a number of challenges including the political and economic 
crisis in Zimbabwe.
217
 As highlighted in chapter one, some scholars attribute this failure to the 
unlimited supervisory powers which the Minister responsible for local government enjoys under 
local government legislations.
218
 In the context of the Urban Councils Act, such powers include 
the powers of the Minister to „direct a council to reverse, suspend or rescind any of its 
resolutions or decisions if he or she considers that the resolutions or decisions are not in the 
interest of the inhabitants of the area, or are not in the national or public interest.‟219 More so, in 
terms of section 313 of the Act, the Minister may give councils directives of a general nature on 
policy which the Minister deems to be requisite in the national interests.
220
 
In chapter two an argument was made that there is a need for a regulatory framework that 
establishes the parameters within which local authorities exercise their autonomy. It was further 
argued that the regulatory framework must not endanger the minimum level of autonomy 
required if local authorities are to be responsive to the needs and preferences of their 
communities. Such autonomy is likely to be protected if; firstly there is a regulatory framework 
that is predictable, as a continuously changing framework is detrimental to local authorities. 
                                                          
216
 See Dewa D, Dziva C and Mukwashi K ‘Exploring Local Governance Challenges in Zimbabwe under the 
Government of National Unity era and beyond’ (2014) 2(8) International Journal of Political Science and 
Development 189. 
217
 See Dewa D, Dziva C and Mukwashi K (2014) 189. 
218
 Constitution Watch ‘Giving Effect to the New Constitution: Local Government: Ministers, Mayors and Money’ 
Zimbabwe Situation 2 October 2013. See also Zhou G (2012) 20 and Chakaipa S 2010(32). 
219
 Urban Councils Act, s314. 
220
 Urban Councils Act, s313. 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
Secondly, the regulatory framework must be limited to setting the parameters within which the 
local government should perform their functions. Thirdly, it was argued that local authorities 
should be involved in the development of the normative regulatory framework and there is need 
for a stable, yet asymmetrical framework for local government. Finally, it was highlighted that 
when the decision-makers are deliberating on the framework, they have to consider how the local 
government will comply with the framework. In chapter three the study provided an overview of 
the urban local government system in Zimbabwe. It is this system that will be examined in this 
chapter with particular focus on the power of the Minister to issue policy directives. The 
examination will be carried out against the normative framework set out in chapter two. The 
chapter will further establish whether section 313 is consistent with the 2013 Constitution.  
4.2 Power to issue policy directives 
 
Section 313 of the Urban Councils Act provides that; 
„(1) Subject to subsection (2), the Minister may give a council such directions of a general character as to the policy 
it is to observe in the exercise of its functions, as appear to the Minister to be requisite in the national interest. 
(2) Where the Minister considers that it might be desirable to give any direction in terms of subsection (1), he shall 
inform the council concerned, in writing, of his proposal and the council shall, within thirty days or such further 
period as the Minister may allow, submit to the Minister, in writing, its views on the proposal and the possible 
implications on the finances and other resources of the council. 
(3) The council shall, with all due expedition, comply with any direction given to it in terms of subsection (1).‟221 
The Minister responsible for local government is vested with significant supervisory powers 
under section 313 of the Urban Councils Act. Section 313 of the Urban Councils Act raises a 
number of questions. Firstly, what is the meaning of council? Secondly, what does „directions of 
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a general nature on policy‟ mean? Thirdly, what is the meaning of national interest? Fourthly, 
what kind of powers may the Minister exercise under the provision? Finally, what does the duty 
to inform entail? This section will attempt to provide answers to those questions. 
4.2.1 What is a council? 
 
Section 313(1) of the Urban Councils Act provides that the Minister may give a council 
directives of a general nature.
222
 The provision further states that the Minister may inform a 
council, when he/she considers it desirable to give such directive.
223
 After the proposal, the 
council, shall submit their views on the proposal and the possible financial implications of the 
directive on the council.
224
 Finally, a council must comply with any directive given in terms of 
section 313(1).
225
 
Section 2 of the Urban Councils Act defines a council as a „municipal council or town 
council.‟226 A local authority is also another term used to refer to a municipal council, town 
council, district council or municipal board.
227
 It is evident from the provision that the original 
intention of the framers of the Act was to deal with councils independently. The Minister is 
obliged to inform the specific council that will be affected by the directive. This entails that the 
Minister may not issue a general directive to all the councils, but only to a council concerned. 
More so, because of the phrase council concerned, it is reasonable and practical to say that in the 
case that the directive will affect more than one council, the Minister may inform those councils 
affected. 
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4.2.2 Policy directives of a general nature 
 
An argument was made in chapter two that a regulatory framework must not be prescriptive 
about how local governments are to perform the functions. It must be limited to setting the 
framework within which local authorities operate. Under section 313 of the Urban Councils Act, 
the Minister may give a council „such directions of a general character as to the policy it is to 
observe in the exercise of its functions’.228 
A directive of a general nature may specify the processes or procedures to be followed by urban 
councils. It may relate merely to a policy that the urban councils are to observe when exercising 
their functions. For example, a directive of a general nature may establish the minimum 
standards required for service delivery or for public participation. It does not for example specify 
how urban councils must provide communities with a certain amount of water or electricity per 
day, but it may only provide that urban councils have a duty to provide the services on a 
sustainable basis. 
4.2.3 The meaning of national interest 
It was highlighted in chapter two that the regulatory framework governing local government 
must be predictable; as a continuously changing framework is detrimental to the local 
government‟s ability to achieve optimal service delivery. 229  Section 313 provides that the 
Minister may give directions of a general nature on policy which the Minister deems to be 
requisite in the national interest.
230
 There is no accepted common standard or definition of the 
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concept of national interest.
231
 Xue-tong is of the view that the understanding of the role or 
meaning of national interest is totally different from one user of the term to another.
232
 
According to Chigora, „national interest refers to the country's goals and ambitions, whether 
economic, military, or cultural‟.233 What then is national interest in the context of section 313 of 
the UCA? The UCA does not define the term national interest. The implication of not having a 
precise meaning of national interest is that when central and local governments have different 
views on what is in the national interest; the central government may make decisions that may 
undermine or compromise the autonomy of urban councils in the name of national interest.
234
 
4.2.4 The discretion given to the Minister to issue policy directives                                                                              
The provision vests the Minister with unlimited supervisory powers. According to section 313, 
the Minister may issue directives „as appear to the Minister to be requisite in the national 
interests‟.235 The provision further states that „where the Minister considers that it might be 
desirable to give any direction in terms of subsection he shall inform the council concerned.‟236 
There is an obligation placed upon the council to submit its views on the proposal within „thirty 
days or such further period as the Minister may allow.‟237 The council has a mandate to comply 
with any direction given to it in terms of subsection (1).
238
 
When issuing a directive, there is a need to differentiate between the objective facts and the 
opinion of the Minister, giving rise to the directive. The Minister‟s opinion with regard to the 
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urban council‟s state of affairs might be helpful, but it not be sufficient to make an informed 
decision. It may be argued that for the Minister to make an objective decision with regard to 
local authorities‟ problems after he/she has received information and views from the council 
concerned. In as much as supervision is critical in governance, section 313 of UCA seem to 
imply that if  the Minister is of the opinion that it is in the national interest, he/she has discretion 
to decide when and how to issue policy directives. More so, notwithstanding the fact that the 
councils may have objections on the directives issued; the provision further states that any of the 
directives from the Minister are binding on the councils and must be complied with 
expeditiously.
239
 It is apparent from section 313 of the UCA that the Act bestows unlimited 
powers on the Minister responsible for local government, thus this impacts negatively on the 
autonomy of urban councils. Lack of autonomy is one of the most critical constraints on urban 
councils to deliver services to their communities. 
4.2.5 The duty to inform an urban authority before issuing policy directives 
 
In chapter two, it was highlighted that local authorities must be consulted when the regulatory 
framework is being developed. Local authorities are to be consulted because they will be 
required to exercise their powers within that framework.
240
 Section 313(2) of the Urban Councils 
Act provides procedural requirements that will need to be followed by the Minister when he/she 
considers issuing a directive.
241
 The Minister is mandated to „inform‟ the council concerned of 
his proposal, in writing. Following the proposal, the council must, within a specified period, 
submit its views and the possible implications on the finances and other resources.
242
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The provision raises a number of questions. Firstly, what does the duty to inform mean? 
Secondly, what happens when the Minister does not inform the councils? Thirdly, is the duty to 
inform consistent with the normative framework set out in chapter two and the 2013 
Constitution?  
The duty to inform entails that the Minister will provide urban councils with facts or information 
concerning the proposal to issue a directive, without taking into account the urban councils views 
in the decision-making.
243
 Consultation differs from informing as it requires the national 
government to seek the views or information from urban councils to inform its own decision-
making.
244
 Steytler and De Visser argue that intergovernmental consultation has three basic 
elements. These elements are that; there must be an invitation to hear the views of a particular 
party, an adequate opportunity to submit considered views on a specified matter and the party 
inviting views must consider those views in good faith.
245
 It is important that local councils be 
informed before a decision is made so that they will be aware of the risks and drawbacks of the 
decision to be made. Regardless of the provision providing for the council to respond to the 
proposal, the requirement of the provision is for a council only to be informed. The provision 
deviates from the normative framework which highlighted that the local governments must be 
consulted not just informed. More so, the provision falls short of the requirement of the 
Constitution which requires that local government must be informed and consulted.  
The Constitution provides for co-operative government. Section 194(1) (g) of the Constitution 
provides that institutions and agencies of government at all levels must co-operate with each 
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other.
246
 Furthermore, provincial and metropolitan and local authorities must within their spheres 
co-operate with one another, in particular by informing one another of and consulting one 
another on matters of common interest; harmonising and coordinating their activities.
247
 The 
Constitution does not technically require central government to consult with local government. 
However, based on the rule of purposive interpretation and drawing from section 194 of the 
Constitution, one can argue that, it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the 
central government must co-operate with local government. Thus, failure of the national 
government to inform and consult the councils on matters that also affect them undermines 
autonomy of urban councils.  
This section of the study provided the problems that can arise from interpreting section 313 of 
the UCA. The following section will provide an assessment of the exercise of the power to issue 
policy directives in light of the normative regulatory framework proposed in chapter two and the 
Constitution. 
4.3 Assessment of policy directives 
 
This section of the work will assess three directives that were issued by the Minister at different 
intervals. It was submitted in chapter one that it is a challenge in Zimbabwe to access 
government policies. Thus, the study will assess two directives that the author has on file. The 
study will rely on secondary sources such as newspaper articles for the third directive. When 
assessing the third directive from newspaper articles, a fourth directive which the author has on 
file will be introduced as an aid to the assessment. First, the study will assess whether the three 
selected directives were limited to standard setting. Secondly, an assessment will be done 
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whether the directives issued where predictable, that is could the local councils have foreseen the 
directives coming. Thirdly, the study will assess whether the directives accommodated the 
differences in local authorities. Fourthly, it will be assessed whether the central government 
involved local councils likely to be affected by the directive in the determination of the 
directives. Finally, the study will assess whether the national government took into consideration 
the compliance costs by the local authorities when preparing the directives. 
The following section will assess the exercise of the power to issue directives with the aid of the 
Ministerial directive to eliminate costs of unnecessary tips and meetings. The study will provide 
a background to the directive. It will also provide the facts, purpose and the consequences that 
are likely to result from issuing directives of such a nature. 
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4.3.1 Figure1: Ministerial directive on elimination of costs on unnecessary trips and meetings 
 
Prior to 2011, local authorities were struggling to pay salaries and deliver relevant municipal and 
other essential service.
248
 The Minister attributed the failure by the local authorities to meet 
various statutory obligations to mismanagement of funds. According to the Minister, local 
authorities were irresponsibly wasting public resources on frivolous and costly internal and 
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foreign trips and were irresponsibly wasting public funds towards holding countless non-
statutory meetings.
249
 Thus, on the 24
th
 of February 2011, the Minister issued a directive on 
elimination of costs. The directive stated that the unnecessary trips and meetings should be 
eliminated and the savings realised from the elimination of the said unnecessary costs should be 
re-channelled towards service delivery and clearing of salaries/wages and statutory obligation 
arrears.
250
 The purpose of the directive was to assist local councils in complying with their 
statutory obligations. 
4.3.1.1 Was the directive limited to the standard setting? 
 
The first question to be answered is whether the directive was limited to standard setting? 
Chapter two pointed out that national government needs to set certain standards regulating the 
activities of local authorities to ensure their developmental objectives are achieved. The chapter 
further highlighted that a framework must be limited to standard setting. It is suggested that the 
directive to eliminate costs was not limited to setting standards within which local councils 
where to perform their functions towards the realisation of their service delivery mandate. The 
directive was too specific. It prohibited local officials from travelling and conducting meetings 
without approval and re-channel the savings towards service delivery. The Minister used the 
directive as a way to intervene into the affairs of local authorities. With standard setting, the 
Minister could have had issued a directive that was limited to setting a range within which local 
authorities could spend on their budgets on trips and meetings. It is the argument of this study 
that the directive to eliminate costs issued by the Minister was not limited to standard setting. 
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4.3.1.2 Was the directive predictable? 
The main question is whether local authorities could have foreseen the directive to eliminate 
costs of trips and meetings. It was highlighted above that local authorities were struggling to 
meet their statutory obligations and the purpose of the directive was to assist local authorities in 
complying with their statutory obligations. It is reasonable to say that, in such instances a 
directive to assist local authorities in realising their service delivery mandate was predictable. 
However, the nature of the directive is problematic. Local authorities could have foreseen a 
general directive reminding them to comply with their statutory obligations and upon failure, a 
specific directive to eliminate costs could have been issued. The issuing of a specific directive to 
stop meetings and trips limited the discretion of local authorities to address local authorities‟ 
compliance challenges through local solutions. Therefore, the directive to eliminate costs was not 
predictable. 
4.3.1.3 Did the directive accommodate differences at local level? 
 
It was argued in chapter two that the differences between local authorities must be considered 
when the national government is exercising their supervisory powers. The section above 
submitted that section 313 of the UCA refers to a council concerned, thus the national 
government must take a differentiated approach when dealing with local councils. When issuing 
the directive to eliminate costs, there seems to be no evidence pointing to the fact that the 
Minister considered the differences in local authorities‟. The directive refers to most local 
authorities. The Minister could have set indicators showing that the directive was to be 
implemented by local councils in a certain category. Because of the phrase „most local 
authorities‟ the directive one can argue that the directive does not differentiate between councils. 
With regard to local authorities in dire financial stress, such a directive would frustrate the 
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emergence of local solutions, which is likely to hamper service delivery in urban councils. More 
so, the nature of the directive compromises the autonomy of local authorities to budget for their 
own communities.  
4.3.1.4 Were local councils involved in the determination of the directive? 
 
Fourthly, it was highlighted in chapter two that the process of determining the directives must be 
inclusive and facilitate appropriate and effective participation of affected local authorities. 
Chapter two discussed that participation by the local authorities in the regulation process is not 
only in line with democratic ideals; it is also the cornerstone upon which the local authorities will 
be able to be account to their communities. The question is whether the affected local authorities 
were involved in the determination of the directive. Section 313 of the UCA provides that the 
council concerned must be informed by the Minister before a directive is issued. There seems to 
be no evidence in the text to suggest that the council(s) were informed or consulted before the 
directive was issued.
251
 More so, the scope of the study did not allow for interviews to be 
conducted, thus it is not clear whether they consulted. There are direct and indirect consequences 
of failing to comply with regulations. In this instance, in the case that central government failed 
to consult with the local authorities, the functionality of the local authorities will be 
compromised. 
4.3.1.5 Did the directive consider the compliance costs? 
 
It was proposed in chapter two that the normative regulatory framework must consider the costs 
of compliance by the local authorities. The manner in which local authorities are to comply with 
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the directives is of paramount importance. The final question on the direction is whether the 
Minister took into consideration the local authorities‟ compliance costs when he/she was 
preparing to issue the directive to eliminate costs. Although the effects of the directive are far-
fetched, there is no evidence to suggest that the Minister considered the costs of compliance 
when issuing the directive. 
Similar to the above- discussed directive, through the use of the directive on employment, the 
study will assess the exercise of power to issue directives. The study will provide a background 
giving rise to the directive on employment. It will further provide the facts, purpose and the 
consequences that are likely to result from issuing such kind of directive. 
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4.3.2 Figure 2: Ministerial directive on employment 
  
Before September 2010, most local authorities were in salary arrears and were also in arrears in 
the remittances of statutory obligations.  This had the effect of negatively impacting on the 
workforce, due to the employment costs. Thus, the Ministry aspired that all salary arrears be 
cleared by the end of the financial year (2010) to allow councils to start the year 2011 on a clean 
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slate.
252
 In a bid to rationalise the employment costs, the Minister issued a directive on 
employment. The directive stipulated that no local authority was to employ any staff member at 
any level or grade, without the Minister‟s written permission.253 Local authorities were required 
to submit some documents to the Minister where compelling reasons existed for recruitment. The 
Minister argued that the directive was not designed to hinder councils in their operations.
254
 
4.3.2.1 Was the directive limited to standard setting? 
 
Similar to the directive discussed above, the first question to be answered on the directive on 
employment is whether the directive was limited to standard setting. It can be argued that the 
directive issued by the Minister on employment goes beyond standard setting. It is evident from 
the directive that local authorities were not only failing to pay salaries; they were also failing to 
comply with their statutory obligations. Owing to the fact that the main aim of the directive was 
to enable councils to start 2011 on a clean slate, the Minister could have proposed standards that 
promoted sound financial management. However, the directive just directed local authorities to 
stop employing any staff member without the written permission of the Minister. Instead of the 
directive assisting in rationalising employment costs, the directive could have an effect of 
hindering councils‟ operations. Thus, the directive could have been consistent with the normative 
regulatory framework if it had been limited to setting standards that promotes sound financial 
management. 
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4.3.2.2 Was the directive predictable? 
 
The second question is whether the directive was predictable? One can argue that the directive 
on employment was not predictable. A directive must enable officials and institutions to achieve 
their objectives. Local authorities are mandated to deliver services. To enable local authorities to 
deliver services there is a need for human capacity. The Minister is responsible for supervising 
all local authorities in Zimbabwe. In the case that all local authorities were to submit and wait for 
approval to recruit from the Minister, it is practical to say that the process could take long. The 
waiting time could likely affect local authorities that were short-staffed. As has been highlighted 
above, for local authorities to deliver on their developmental mandate they need capacity. Where 
there is lack of capacity it is likely that service delivery will be affected. Thus, what could have 
been predictable to the local authorities could be the central government allowing them to 
temporarily employ pending written approval of the Minister to enable them to deliver services. 
4.3.2.3 Did the directive accommodate differences in local government? 
 
Thirdly, does the directive accommodate the differences that might exist between local 
authorities? Similar to the directive discussed above, it can be argued that the directive did not 
consider the differences in local councils as the directive also referred to „most local authorities.‟ 
The directive could have differentiated between understaffed local councils from those with 
enough human capacity. It is likely that such a directive could have affected the former more 
than the latter. Therefore, it appears that due to the phrase most local authorities, the Minister did 
not accommodate the differences between local authorities. 
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4.3.2.4 Were the local councils involved in the determination of the directive? 
 
The fourth question is whether the process of determining the directive involved the participation 
of the local authorities.  There is no evidence in the directive that suggests that the councils were 
informed or consulted before the directive was issued. It is clear that the directive seems to have 
an effect of hindering the operations of the understaffed councils. Thus, it is reasonable to say 
that if councils were consulted before the directive was issued, they could have had challenged 
the directive. This entails that such a directive could not have been issued.  
4.3.2.5 Did the directive consider the compliance costs? 
 
Finally, did the directive consider how the local authorities were going to comply with such a 
directive? It can be argued that the directive did not take into account bureaucratic costs. The 
directive stated that where compelling reasons exist for recruitment, local authorities should 
submit some documents to the Minister. The directive failed to consider that the process of 
submission of documents would be costly to councils that were already in dire financial stress. 
Thus, the directive seems to only have taken into account the factor of reducing salary arrears 
and disregarded the fact that the process of submission had financial implications.  
The following section will assess the exercise of the power to issue directives with the aid of the 
third directive. It is a challenge to access government policies in Zimbabwe. Thus, unlike the 
other directives, the actual directive is not included in the study. Secondary sources were used to 
gather information with regard to the directive. However, the directive urging local authorities to 
implement the directive to write off debts is included below. 
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4.3.3 Ministerial directive to write off debts 
 
Figure 3: Implementation of the Ministerial directive to all local authorities to write of debts 
 
  
In terms of section 303 of the Urban Councils Act;  
„A council may write off amounts, excluding rates, owing to the council by any person if- 
(a) the council considers that such amounts are irrecoverable; or 
(b) in the opinion of the council the difficulties, disadvantages or costs of collection thereof outweigh the value 
thereof.‟255 
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Ahead of the 2013 national elections, economic sanctions were making it difficult for the citizens 
to meet their obligations.
256
 Thus, as part of the pro-poor policies of the Zanu PF party, the 
Minister issued a directive to the local authorities to write off debts in respect of various services 
rendered by councils between the period 2009 and 2013.
257
 The directive stipulated that all local 
authorities had to write off debts with immediate effect as it had become clear that debts were 
irrecoverable and that councils were spending more resources in trying to recover them. The 
purpose of the directive was to lessen the effects of the hard economic environment on the 
residents. Thus, the Minister used his supervisory powers under section 313 to write off debts in 
terms of section 303. Some local authorities defied the directive, others viewed it as a political 
gimmick whilst others regarded it to be irrational.
258
 Thus, the Ministry issued another directive 
(figure 3) urging local authorities to implement the first directive to write off debts.
259
 Local 
authorities were instructed to publish and advertise their progress with regards to implementation 
of the first directive.
260
 
4.3.3.1 Was the directive limited to standard setting? 
 
In terms of section 303, a council has the power to write off amounts where the council considers 
that such amounts are irrecoverable or in the opinion of the council the difficulties, 
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disadvantages or costs of collection outweigh the value thereof.
261
 It is clear from the provision 
that a council has limited powers to write off amounts. The Minister has no power in terms of 
section 303 of the UCA to write off debts. Notwithstanding that there was a provision providing 
for writing off of amounts by the local council; the Minister still issued the directive in terms of 
section 313 of the Act. This entails that the Minister assumed powers not provided for in the 
provision and issued the directive to write off debts. It can be argued that by issuing the directive 
to write off debts, the Minister did not set the standards; rather he/she intervened into the affairs 
of local authorities by assuming the local authorities‟ responsibilities to write off amounts. 
4.3.3.2 Was the directive predictable? 
 
It is the argument of this study that the directive to write off debts was not predictable. As 
highlighted above, there was a provision that provided for the writing off of debts and the 
Minister assumed powers that were not bestowed in him/her. A council could not have foreseen 
such a directive when section 303 of the UCA provides for grounds upon which amounts can be 
written off. Owing to the fact that the directive was not predictable other local authorities as 
stated above defied it,
262
 thus leading to a second directive compelling local authorities to 
implement the directive (figure 3). More so, it appears that the directive was not predictable as 
the legality of the directive is still in question.
263
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4.3.3.3 Did the directive accommodate differences in local government? 
 
The third question is whether the directive accommodated the differences that might exist 
between local authorities? The directive referred to „all local authorities,‟ which is also shown in 
the directive to implement the first directive. The phrase „all local authorities‟ mean that the 
directive was targeting both urban and rural councils. It was highlighted in chapter three that 
urban local authorities derive most of their income from the fees they charge which can be 
distinguished from rural local authorities.
264
 More so, other local authorities were in dire 
financial stress due to huge amounts owed by ratepayers.
265
 There seems to be no evidence 
pointing to the fact that the directive did consider all those differences. Thus, one can argue that 
the directive did not accommodate the differences in local councils. 
4.3.3.4 Were the local councils involved in the determination of the directive? 
 
It was highlighted in chapter two that local authorities must be consulted on matters that affects 
them. Section 313(2) of the UCA provides that after a council concerned has been informed of 
the proposal, it „shall within thirty days or such further period as the Minister may allow‟ submit 
its views on the implications the directive will have on their finances and resources. What can be 
construed from the provision is that a council must be given an adequate opportunity to submit 
its views. However, what is clear is that the directive was issued on the 22
nd
 of July 2013 and the 
elections were held on the 31
st
 of July 2013.
266 
 Local authorities could not have had ample time 
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to address their problems during that time. It is practical that towards election time people, even 
councillors who are tasked with governing the affairs of local authorities tend to focus more on 
campaigning for votes rather than problems that might be affecting local authorities at that time. 
Furthermore, the fact that other local authorities defied the directive which led the Minister to 
issue the directive urging local authorities to implement the first directive seems to suggest that 
local authorities were not consulted when the directive was issued.  
4.3.3.5 Did the directive consider the compliance costs? 
The overriding question in this regard is whether the Minister considered the financial 
implications the directive to write off debts was going to have on local authorities. For residents 
to have better service delivery it is crucial that a council has the ability to properly determine the 
cost of providing the services. Upon debt cancellation, it was not certain on the impact the 
directive was going to have on local authorities. One of the major negative impacts of the 
directive is that it set a wrong precedent. There were residents who were up to date with their 
payments who stopped paying debts at all.
267
 On the other hand, there were also ratepayers who 
were in default with their payments who continued not paying for services.
268
 Some critics 
viewed the directive as a punishment to those who were paying utility bills on time and was 
likely to encourage people to delay paying their bills.
269
 Currently local authorities are struggling 
financially and the deteriorating financial situation is linked to the debt cancellation.
270
 More so, 
with the implementation directive, it is evident that the central government did not take into 
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account the compliance costs. The advertising and publishing costs created a financial burden on 
local authorities who had already lost finances due to the first directive. Thus, it is reasonable to 
conclude that central government did not consider the administration and compliance costs. 
It can be observed from the discussion above that the directives do not comply with the 
normative framework proposed in chapter two. Firstly, all the directives issued exceeded the 
boundaries of a proposed normative regulatory framework. Secondly, the directives were not 
predictable, as is shown by the inconsistencies in the manner in which central government dealt 
with local authorities‟ challenges. Thirdly, the directives do not accommodate the differences 
between the local authorities as all the above discussed directives refers to „most‟ or „all local 
authorities.‟ Fourthly, it is evident that the local authorities were not involved in the 
determination of the directives.  Finally, one can argue that the central government did not 
consider the compliance costs of local authorities when preparing the directives which is not only 
shown by the problems that the directives are causing in practice, but also the fact that if all those 
factors were considered, such directives could not have been issued.  
It was emphasised in the discussion that the directives being issued by the Minister do not 
comply with the normative framework due to various reasons. However, assessing section 313 of 
the UCA only in light of the normative framework is not sufficient. Owing to the fact that the 
2013 Constitution explicitly provided for the functionality of local authorities, it is reasonable 
that section 313 of the UCA also be judged against the constitutional framework. The following 
section of the study will assess the constitutionality of the provision. The first part of the section 
will assess section 313 in light of the Lancaster House Constitution which was the supreme law 
prior to the 2013 Constitution. The second section will assess whether section 313 is consistent 
with the 2013 Constitution which guarantees some measure of autonomy to local authorities.  
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4.4 Consistency of the power to issue policy directives with the Constitution 
The assessment of the constitutionality of section 313 of the UCA is also informed by the 
practice that was discussed above. The following section will assess the constitutionality of the 
exercise of the power to issue directives. 
4.4.1 Lancaster House Constitution 
 
Since the Lancaster House Constitution, the Zimbabwean government had made a few attempts 
to decentralise power through legislation.
271
 Decentralisation was not enshrined in the 
Constitution. While the Constitution provided for institutions that had a strong bearing on urban 
local governance, such as the provincial, district and regional governors; urban local government 
was established through the Urban Councils Act.
272
 According to Chakaipa, local government 
was viewed as the „establishment of a lower sphere of governance for the purpose of executing 
functions that central government was too far removed to carry out effectively.‟273 The ability of 
local government to make decisions that addressed local needs was hampered as local 
government was managed by the central government.
274
 
As was highlighted above, the local government system prior to the 2013 Constitution was based 
on a delegate and delegator relationship; with local authorities being the delegate and the central 
government the delegator.
275
 Urban councils were a creature of the central government.
276
 More 
so, the Lancaster House Constitution did not provide for autonomy of urban authorities. During 
the Lancaster House Constitution it was reasonable for central government to exercise any kind 
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of supervisory powers on urban authorities. The power to issue directives was consistent with the 
constitutional order even if it had consequences of undermining or compromising autonomy of 
urban councils. 
4.4.2 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 20 of 2013 
 
The Constitution guarantees urban local government with the right to govern on its own initiative 
the affairs of its communities.
277
 The Constitution further states that an Act of Parliament may 
confer functions on local authorities.
278
 As has been highlighted in the previous chapter, the Act 
of Parliament governing urban councils is the Urban Councils Act. Section 2 of the Constitution 
states that the Constitution is the supreme law of Zimbabwe and any law, practice, custom or 
conduct that is inconsistent with it is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency.
279
As has been 
highlighted above, the Constitution establishes local government as a tier of government. While 
the Constitution does not explicitly provide for the supervisory powers of the national 
government, it provides for the values and principles of how the national government must 
supervise local authorities. The following section will discuss some of the constitutional 
provisions that limit the powers of the national government with regard to the affairs of local 
government. 
The Constitution itself elevates local government to a tier of government and gives local 
authorities the powers they need to govern the local affairs of their people. Section 276(1) of the 
Constitution vests the local authority with the right to govern, on its own initiative, the local 
affairs of the people within the area for which it has been established, and a local authority has 
                                                          
277
 Constitution of Zimbabwe, s276. 
278
 Constitution of Zimbabwe, s276 (2). 
279
 Constitution of Zimbabwe, s2. 
 
 
 
 
71 
 
„all‟ the powers necessary to do so. 280  This provision is confirmation that the Constitution 
recognises the importance of the autonomy of local authorities.
281
 Thus, while other tiers of 
government may supervise the functioning of local government; this must be done without 
encroaching on the institutional integrity of local government. Section 265(1) (c) of the 
Constitution provides that when different levels of government are exercising their functions, 
they must do it in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional 
integrity of another tier of government.
282
 
It is evident from the directives discussed above that in the exercise of supervisory powers under 
section 313 of the UCA, central government is undermining and compromising autonomy of 
local authorities. The directive to write off debts can attest to that fact. When the Minister issued 
the directive to write off debts it encroached on the autonomy of the councils. Its effect was 
prejudicial to the local authorities as they were removed from their positions against their will 
with adverse financial implications. This entails that the nature of the powers being exercised 
under section 313 are inconsistent with the Constitution. 
The Constitution further provides for institutional integrity, co-operative governance and good 
governance. The principles and values of the Constitution signify that supervision of the local 
authorities by the central government must be exercised within limits. Section 313 of the UCA 
provides that the Minister may issue directives of a general nature. This entails that the Minister 
may not give directives which are specific, as they have the impact of limiting unjustifiably the 
powers of the urban councils. The above discussion provided evidence that section 313 of the 
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UCA is being used to issue specific directives to UCs. It can be argued that the limitation of 
powers required by the Constitution is not complied with when the Minister is exercising the 
power to issue policy directives. Therefore, because of the unlimited powers being exercised 
under the veil of section 313 which does not respect the principles and values of the Constitution, 
the provision is inconsistent with the Constitution. 
A local authority has the right to govern on its own initiative. In the context of South Africa, 
Steytler and De Visser argue that the use of the word „right‟ emphasises that a local authority is 
entitled to govern the affairs of its own communities and that entitlement can be claimed and 
defended in terms of the Constitution.
283
 They further argue that the phrase on its own initiative 
„marks the end to the era when municipalities were the implementers of national and provincial 
legislation and had no policy making authority of their own‟.284 The principles and values of 
supervision will entail that, upon failure to govern, national government will exercise their 
supervisory role within limits. Section 313(3) provides that councils are to comply with „any‟ 
direction given to it in terms of section 313(1).
285
 If councils are to comply with any direction 
that it is given, does that not undermine the autonomy of councils as provided for in the 
Constitution? One can argue that the text is in violation with the Constitution because it does not 
respect the institutional integrity of urban councils. 
It is clear that the Constitution recognises the importance of local government to be involved in 
the determination of matters that affect them. The principle of co-operative governance as 
explained above provides that local government is to be informed „and‟ consulted on matters of 
common interests. This entails that the Constitution places an obligation on the other tiers of 
                                                          
283
 Steytler N & De Visser (2007) 22-44. 
284
 Steytler N & De Visser (2007) 22-45. 
285
 Urban Councils Act, s313 (3). 
 
 
 
 
73 
 
government to inform and consult the local government on matters that are of common interest. 
Unlike what is provided for in the Constitution, section 313 of the UCA provides that the 
Minister only has to inform the council concerned if he/she considers issuing a directive.
286
 
Under the principle of co-operative governance, informing is not sufficient; hence the provision 
is inconsistent with the Constitution.  
4.5 Conclusion 
 
The chapter argued that the power to issue policy directives bestowed in the central government 
is important for a number of reasons. However, it was highlighted that the nature of the powers 
exercised under section 313 of the UCA undermines and compromises the autonomy of the UCs 
which is provided for in the Constitution. The chapter highlighted that the Minister is exercising 
powers that are not vested in him under section 313, as shown by the directive to write off debts. 
Furthermore, it was highlighted that the provision allows for a liberal interpretation which is 
likely to undermine the autonomy of the urban councils. The powers are also inconsistent with 
the normative framework set in chapter two and the principles and values of the Constitution. 
The final chapter will provide the conclusion and recommendations with regard to section 313 of 
the UCA. 
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CHAPTER 5 : CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
 
It was submitted in chapter one that supervision of local authorities by the national government 
is important to promote the realisation of national and local goals such as efficient and effective 
delivery of public services. In Zimbabwe, the Urban Councils Act gives the central government 
various supervisory powers. Ministerial directives are one of the ways used by the national 
government to ensure that the activities of urban local authorities are in line with national 
policies and objectives. It was submitted that when exercising the power to issue policy 
directives it is important that the national government does not undermine the minimum level of 
local autonomy. Local autonomy is vital if local authorities are to effectively deliver on their 
service delivery mandate and developmental objectives. If a certain measure of local autonomy is 
not guaranteed, then local authorities are unlikely to respond to the needs and preferences of their 
communities. Thus, it is important that supervisory powers, such as the power to issue policy 
directives in terms of section 313 of the UCA are exercised in such a way which does not 
undermine local autonomy and local accountability. 
The 2013 Constitution provides for devolution of powers to local authorities.
287
 As was 
highlighted in chapter four, the Constitution further provides for the principles and values such 
as the right of communities to govern on their own initiative, institutional integrity, cooperative 
governance, among others.
288
 These principles and values signify that supervision of the local 
authorities by the national government must be exercised within limits.  
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Chapter one gave a background to the study and posed the question whether the exercise of the 
power to issue policy directives in terms of section 313 of the UCA is limited to framework 
setting. It was further posed whether section 313 of the UCA is consistent with the 2013 
Constitution, which guarantees local authorities some measure of autonomy? In chapter two, the 
study defined the concept supervision as including four distinct but interrelated activities which 
are regulation, monitoring, support and intervention.
289
 The chapter proposed a normative 
framework which higher governments must adhere to when setting regulatory frameworks for 
local governments. Chapter three provided a brief overview of urban local government in 
Zimbabwe. In chapter four, the study examined section 313 of the UCA in light of the normative 
framework that was proposed in chapter two and the Constitution. The following section of the 
study will provide the major findings: 
5.1.1 Supervisory powers under section 313 of the UCA go beyond framework setting 
 
In chapter two it was pointed out that the national government needs to establish a framework 
comprising, for example certain standards for service delivery to enable the achievement of 
national and local goals at the local level. The chapter further argued that the framework should 
not extend to the core of the matter, but provides guidelines within which local government is to 
exercise the powers. It was argued in chapter four that the directives that were being issued by 
the Minister were exceeding the boundaries of a proposed normative framework. The directives 
issued were not limited to setting national standards to be complied by local authorities rather, 
they were being used as intervention mechanisms.  
                                                          
289
 Steytler N and De Visser J Local Government Law of South Africa (2007) 15-5. See Steytler N ‘Introduction’ in The 
place and role of local government in federal systems in Steytler N(ed.) (2005) 7. See Machingauta N ‘Supervision 
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5.1.2 Minister is exercising powers beyond powers provided for under section 313 of the UCA 
The study also demonstrated that in the exercise of the supervisory powers under section 313, the 
Minister is exceeding the powers vested in him/her to issue policy directives. It was argued that 
the incorrect use of powers to issue policy directives has an impact on local autonomy, local 
accountability and service delivery. Section 313 provides that the Minister must inform the 
councils before issuing the directives. From the policy directives discussed in chapter four, it is 
evident that the Minister issued the policy directives without informing the councils. More so, 
section 313 provides that the Minister must issue directives of a general nature, to a council 
concerned. However, the examples provided in chapter four shows otherwise. The Minister is 
incorrectly using the powers provided in section 313 as the directives refer to all or most 
councils. The directives are not targeting an identifiable council or group of councils, they are 
targeting all or most councils.   
5.2 Recommendations 
 
The challenges of the provision have been identified above. The overall effect of powers 
exercised under the provision is that they undermine the autonomy of urban local authorities. 
When exercising the power to issue directives, a balance must be struck between the need to 
supervise and protecting autonomy of local authorities. To strike a balance, this section will 
provide proposals which are discussed below. 
5.2.1 Remove wide discretion given to the Minister 
 
It was submitted above that in the exercise of the supervisory powers under section 313; the 
Minister is exceeding the powers of the provision or interpreting the provision too widely. This is 
because of the wording of the provision which allows the Minister to issue directives as appear 
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to him/her to be requisite in the national interest.
290
 The provision further states that where the 
Minister considers that it might be desirable to give any direction in terms of subsection he shall 
inform the council concerned.
291
 It is evident that from the wording of the provision, that the 
Minister has unlimited supervisory powers. In this regard, it is recommended that the law 
regulating policy directives must be amended to be in line with the 2013 Constitution which 
provides for local government autonomy. One can argue that the principles and values that are 
provided in the Constitution, especially the right of local authorities to govern their communities 
on their own initiative should guide the reform of section 313 of the UCA. 
5.2.2 Policy directives must be predictable 
 
It is recommended that the grounds upon which the Minister may resort to a policy directive 
should be clearly spelt out. The grounds upon which directives may be issued may be based on 
the Constitution. As has been highlighted in chapter four, the Constitution provides for values 
and principles. The law may explicitly highlight that policy directives may be issued to promote 
those principles and values. Thus, when the policy directives are predictable there is likelihood 
that the Minister will not abuse the powers bestowed on him/her. 
5.2.3 The law should require consultation of urban local authorities before the Minister may 
issue policy directives 
As was argued in the chapter four, when urban local authorities are informed and consulted in 
matters of common interests, it is likely that they will respond to the proposals and give their 
views on possible implications of the directive on the financial and other resources of the 
council. The responses of the urban councils will not only help the central government to make 
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informed decisions, they will also enhance the quality of the directives to be issued. It was 
submitted in chapter four that the current legislation which requires urban councils to be merely 
informed in matters of common interest is not only inconsistent with the Constitution; it is also 
against the normative framework set out in chapter two. In that regard, a proposal is made that 
the provision be reformed to provide that the Minister must inform and consult UCs in matters of 
common interest before issuing directives so as to enhance the quality of the directives. Such a 
move will not only go a long way in preventing the unnecessary meddling into the affairs of UCs 
by the national government; it is also consistent with the 2013 Constitution. 
5.2.4 Consider compliance/implementation costs before issuing policy directives 
 
Section 313 provides that before the Minister issues a policy directive, a council is required to 
respond to the directions and may give its views on the implications the directive will have on its 
financial status and other resources of the council. This entails that compliance costs must 
become part of the consultation process so that the Minister cannot escape that issue. In the case 
that the costs of complying with the directive are too high, the Minister may provide support to 
the council or choose a differently worded directive. It is recommended that the legal framework 
regulating the issuing of directives must make it clear that the Minister is obliged to consider 
compliance costs before he/she issues a policy directive. The framework must require, for 
example, that compliance costs be included in the agenda where policy directives will be 
deliberated upon. More so, consideration of compliance costs may be s criteria which the 
Minister will be obliged to adhere to before issuing policy directives. 
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5.2.5 Limit supervisory powers 
 
It is evident from the discussion in chapter four that section 313 of the UCA gives the Minister 
wide powers. The provision is not clear with regard to the meaning of phrases like national 
interest, which enables the Minister to exercise any powers he/she deems to be in the national 
interest. The provision is not specific to what kind of powers the Minister may exercise; thus, as 
highlighted in chapter four, the Minister is either exercising powers that go beyond powers 
provided for under section 313 or he/she is exercising powers that are not even bestowed on 
him/her under the veil of section 313 of the UCA. Such exercise of powers has adversely 
affected the ability of urban local authorities to provide local solutions to local problems.  In this 
regard, it is recommended that the Constitution or other national legislation must set the 
parameters of the powers of the Minister of Local Government.  
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